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What	Sauli	Niinistö’s	re-election	means	for	Finnish
foreign	policy
Sauli	Niinistö	secured	his	re-election	as	Finland’s	President	with	a	comfortable	first-round	victory	on	28
January.	Matti	Pesu	assesses	what	the	result	means	for	the	country,	particularly	in	the	area	of	foreign
policy,	where	the	President	has	significant	constitutional	powers.
Finland’s	soil	is	not	prone	to	landslides.	However,	in	politics,	Finland	has	just	witnessed	a	historic
landslide	victory,	which	secured	President	Sauli	Niinistö’s	second	six-year	term.
The	incumbent’s	re-election	was	no	surprise;	the	polls	have	displayed	Niinistö’s	popularity	throughout	his	first	term,
which	began	in	2012.	Although	a	second	round	would	have	been	a	minor	surprise,	Niinistö’s	62.7	percent	of	the
votes	was	nonetheless	a	stunning	victory;	the	polls	were	right	all	along	and	Niinistö	did	not	lose	the	high	numbers
which	the	Finnish	media	was	keen	to	speculate	about.
In	Finland,	the	President	is	elected	through	a	direct	popular	vote.	The	system	was	introduced	in	1994,	and,	until
these	elections,	no	candidate	had	been	able	to	win	the	race	in	the	first	round	–	a	performance	which	requires	50
percent	of	the	votes.	Niinistö	–	a	former	National	Coalition	Party	chair	–	ran	as	an	independent	candidate	backed	by
a	popular	movement.	It	proved	a	shrewd	tactical	manoeuvre,	and	his	support	transcended	party	lines.	Consequently,
for	the	big	parties	such	as	the	Social	Democrats	and	the	Centre	Party,	the	elections	were	a	major	blow.	The	Centre
Party’s	candidate,	the	former	Prime	Minister	Matti	Vanhanen,	finished	fifth	with	4.2	percent	of	votes.	Tuula
Haatainen,	a	Social	Democrat,	came	sixth	with	a	modest	3.3	percent.
Credit:	stanjourdan	(CC	BY-SA	3.0)
There	are	a	number	of	reasons	for	Niinistö’s	popularity.	First,	and	quite	paradoxically,	Niinistö	began	to	rise	to	favour
in	the	1990s	when	he	as	the	Minister	of	Finance	advocated	strong	austerity	measures.	The	independently	minded
lawyer	has	ever	since	been	one	of	the	most	popular	politicians	in	Finland.	An	affecting	life	story	–	Niinistö	was
widowed	in	1995	(remarried	in	2009)	and	survived	the	Indian	Ocean	Tsunami	in	2004	–	has	further	increased	his
appeal.
Second,	Niinistö’s	diplomatic	activity	has	been	considered	a	success.	In	2017,	he	hit	the	jackpot	by	meeting	Donald
Trump,	Xi	Jingping,	Vladimir	Putin	and	a	host	of	other	world	leaders.	Furthermore,	2017	was	Finland’s	centennial,
which	gave	Niinistö	additional	visibility.
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Third,	for	many	Finns	Niinistö	is	the	embodiment	of	a	statesman.	He	is	somewhat	distant	yet	not	indifferent,
prestigious	yet	not	arrogant,	circumspect	yet	determined.	He	speaks	in	vague	terms	but	still	manages	to	convince	the
public	and	to	convey	his	message.	Lastly	and	importantly,	Niinistö	was	the	incumbent,	and	during	a	turbulent	era	in
international	politics,	Finns	clearly	preferred	stability	and	continuity	to	change.
A	strong	leader
Niinistö’s	first	term	was	something	of	a	paradox.	On	the	one	hand,	he	operated	with	ever	more	limited	constitutional
powers.	In	terms	of	presidential	prerogatives,	Niinistö	is	the	least	powerful	President	in	Finnish	history,	since	the
office	has	been	all	but	stripped	of	substantive	domestic	power.	The	Constitution	however	grants	significant	authority
over	foreign	affairs,	which	the	President,	according	to	the	Constitution,	is	responsible	for	in	cooperation	with	the
government.
On	the	other	hand,	mainly	through	his	foreign	policy	activity,	Niinistö	was	able	to	de	facto	assume	a	much	stronger
position	than	his	predecessor,	Tarja	Halonen.	During	his	first	term,	Niinistö	indeed	became	the	unquestioned	leader
of	Finnish	foreign	and	security	policy,	and	he	has	consolidated	his	predominance	during	the	rule	of	the	current
government	led	by	Juha	Sipilä.	In	terms	of	foreign	policy,	the	government	in	office	is	weak,	and	as	Prime	Minister
Sipilä	has	not	expressed	considerable	interest	in	foreign	affairs.	Niinistö	has	stepped	in	and	successfully	filled	the
vacuum.
According	to	Niinistö’s	own	description,	Finnish	foreign	and	security	policy	rests	on	four	pillars:	strong	national
defence,	Western	partnerships,	international	rule-based	order,	and	relations	with	Russia.	It	is	noteworthy	that,
regardless	of	the	annexation	of	Crimea	and	the	war	in	Ukraine,	Niinistö	has	decided	to	maintain	regular	contacts	with
Vladimir	Putin.	However,	in	its	bilateral	interaction	with	Russia,	Finland	has	acted	out	of	the	EU’s	common	policy	line,
and	the	ambition	of	Finland’s	Russia	policy	has	been	modest.	No	new	bilateral	initiatives	have	been	introduced.	It
seems	that	Niinistö	simply	likes	to	know	what	Putin	thinks,	and	this	connection	to	Moscow	brings	him	a	certain	status
within	the	community	of	Western	leaders.
More	importantly,	Niinistö	has	spearheaded	a	major	change	in	Finnish	defence	and	security	policy.	Non-alignment
has	all	but	lost	its	practical	relevance,	and	the	old	doctrine	no	longer	drives	Finnish	security	policy.	Rather,	Finland’s
security	and	defence	policy	stems	from	Western	partnerships.	That	is	to	say,	bilateral	cooperation	with	Sweden	has
intensified;	a	Swedish-Finnish	Naval	Task	Group	will	soon	be	operative,	and	the	countries	exercise	territorial	defence
together.	Moreover,	the	focus	of	Finnish-NATO	cooperation	has	moved	from	crisis	management	to	supporting
Finnish	national	defence	and	NATO’s	collective	defence.	In	addition	to	this,	militarily	Helsinki	is	closer	to	Washington
than	ever	before,	and	the	statement	of	intent	between	the	capitals	facilitates	ever	more	strengthened	cooperation.
In	other	words,	due	to	Finland’s	changed	policy	line,	the	country	is	more	tightly	connected	to	the	European	security
system,	and,	as	a	result,	Finland	is	part	of	the	Western	strategic	deterrence	in	the	Baltic	sea	region.
What	to	expect	of	the	second	term?
It	is	likely	that	Niinistö	will	hold	on	to	his	strong	position.	The	question	is:	what	will	he	do	with	this	exceptionally	strong
mandate?	Given	the	lack	of	foreign	policy	figures	in	Finnish	politics,	Niinistö	will	probably	retain	his	predominance	in
foreign	affairs.	Unlike	at	the	beginning	of	his	first	term,	he	now	has	a	clear	framework	for	pursuing	Finnish	interests,
namely	the	idea	of	the	four	pillars.	In	addition	to	intensifying	the	existing	partnership,	Helsinki	might	thus	pursue	a
limited	global	agenda,	since	Niinistö	has	hinted	that	Finland’s	global	profile	needs	clarification.
It	remains	to	be	seen	whether	the	President	can	resist	the	temptation	to	comment	on	domestic	matters.	Such	an
activity	could	be	deemed	unconstitutional,	but	it	is	something	that	the	Finnish	public	wishes.	Remaining	outside	of
domestic	quarrels	might	be	wise,	however,	since	domestic	power	battles	could	endanger	his	authority	in	foreign
policy.	The	cobbler	should	thus	stick	to	his	last.
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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